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• During the 2008 financial crisis, the G20 was hastily elevated to ‘global economic stee-
ring committee’. In the early stages of the crisis, the G20 was an effective forum for
crisis containment. As the crisis has eased, however, the G20 has lost both direction
and momentum. Governments and policymakers have felt less need to act in unison
and have rather refocused on their national agendas, as is their duty and primary func-
tion. However, effective global governance is needed permanently, not just in crisis
times. It is desirable to have more representative and effective global governance that,
among other things, is equipped to prevent crises rather than just react to them.
• In an environment of rapid change in global patterns of trade and wealth creation, a
new revamped (but highly representative) grouping should be created within the G20,
to provide leadership on key economic policy matters. Euro-area members should give
up their individual seats in this G7+, allowing room for China and other large emerging
economies. Without euro-area countries taking such a step, it would be impossible to
reconcile effectiveness and representation in this new G7+, which would take charge
of decision making on global economic imbalances, financial and monetary issues.
All existing G20 countries, including individual euro-area countries, would however
remain in the G20, which could potentially expand and would remain the prime forum
for discussion on all remaining matters at global level. 
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1. See for example Angeloni
and Pisani-Ferry (2012).
2. Authors’ conversation
with a G20 member, March
2014.
IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS, the G20 proved to be an effective forum for
crisis containment, agreeing to (i) launch a coor-
dinated fiscal stimulus at global level, (ii)
strengthen the financial safety net by increasing
the resources available to the International Mone-
tary Fund, (iii) enhancing regulatory and supervi-
sory regimes by establishing the Financial
Stability Board and agreeing on Basel III. However,
as recovery from the crisis has gradually pro-
gressed (with some notable exceptions, espe-
cially in the euro area), G20 progress on finding
agreement in many areas, including shadow bank-
ing and regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) deriv-
atives, has been very slow. In some areas, the
momentum has come to a halt (Véron, 2014). For
example, a viable way forward on resolving sys-
temic financial institutions across borders has yet
to be identified (Shafik, 2013). The stalling of the
G20 has led to questions being raised about
whether the G20 is still delivering (Bertoldi et al,
2013), whether it is the right forum for discussion
on global macroeconomic issues (Pisani-Ferry,
2009), whether its agenda should be refocused
(Bénassy-Quéré et al, 2009) and what its future
should be (Asmussen, 2013).
A recent Bruegel (O’Neill and Terzi, 2014a) survey
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of G20 Sherpas – the high-level advisors of heads
of state or government – found that the main fac-
tors hampering the forum’s effectiveness are its
excessively wide policy agenda and its overly het-
erogeneous composition. Figure 1 shows the com-
position of the group of Sherpas who responded
to the survey.
Although recognising that organisational changes
can never be a substitute for substance and
vision, some experts have suggested that the cre-
ation of a G20 steering committee or permanent
secretariat could alleviate these problems1. Given
the nature of the G20, composed of the heads of
state and government of the largest countries, we
doubt a bureaucratic entity could effectively
streamline the agenda and decision-making
within the forum. Putting it more bluntly, one G20
participant explained how, in his view, “[within the
G20 setting] nobody listens to the IMF itself, so it
is not clear why they would listen to the secre-
tariat”2. We would certainly share the view that the
IMF needs to raise its delivery standards, as we
detail later in this Policy Contribution. 
Meanwhile, as the G20’s decision making falters,
the forum is failing to fully achieve its own objec-
tives as spelled out in the Framework for Strong,
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Current G20 Sherpa
Other
Central banker
Former G20 Sherpa
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
G7 member
Other
International org’n
EU member state
BRIC group
Figure 1: G20 Sherpa Survey, respondents’ current post (left panel) and geographical origin of
employing institution (right panel)
Source: O’Neill and Terzi, 2014a.
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Sustainable and Balanced Growth, which are:
maintaining sound public finances, promoting bal-
anced current accounts, implementing structural
reforms with the objective of raising global poten-
tial growth, preventing asset bubbles and under-
taking monetary policy with a view to price
stability and keeping exchange rates aligned with
fundamentals3.
World growth has indeed recovered since the
crisis, but it has been generally regarded as
disappointing with the actual pace of recovery
repeatedly falling shy of consensus forecasts, and
those of the IMF. Moreover, the global debt-to-GDP
ratio has continued soaring since the introduction
of the sustainable growth framework in 2009
(Figure 2), raising the possibility that one of the
perceived primary causes of the 2007-08 crisis
has become an even bigger issue. While there
remains considerable debate about whether the
continued growth of debt reflects the
sluggishness of some economic recoveries or a
poor mix of spending and taxation policies, a
number of emerging economies regard the
continued rise of debt in so-called developed
economies as a particular burden for them in a
world in which the monetary system and its
governance remains so dominated by the current
G7 members, and is a key reason why many of
them – justifiably in our view – desire significant
change. In particular, several Chinese academics
and policymakers have said that unsustainable
public finances and soaring debt levels in
advanced economies are undermining the
stability of the currencies that dominate the
current monetary system, with a detrimental
3. Leaders' Statement fol-
lowing the G20 Pittsburgh
Summit (2009).
4. See, for example, BRICs
Sanya Declaration (2011).
effect on their invested reserves. At times, implicit
if not explicit criticism has featured in statements
by the BRICs political leaders about the
dominance of the G7 countries in global
governance, especially as it relates to monetary
matters4.
Meanwhile, investment on a global level is per-
forming quite poorly, possibly resulting from the
same fears about rising total debt levels, crowd-
ing out (although low levels of bond yields and
interest rates more generally do not support this)
and related heightened uncertainty about the
future.
However, and this is probably an under-discussed
improvement at world level, current account
imbalances have alleviated since the crisis (O’Neill
and Terzi, 2014b). Both the United States and
China have seen their balance-of-payments imbal-
ances improve by more than 50 percent since the
crisis, with the US deficit below 3 percent of GDP
and China’s surplus similarly low. This has
occurred despite the inability of the G20 to agree
a common framework and targets for current
account imbalances at the Seoul 2010 G20 meet-
ing. It might be argued that this suggests not only
the limitations of the current G20 but also that the
G20 is not so important anyway. For the US and
China to have made this progress while maintain-
ing growth is an important positive development.
This said, of course, the current account surplus
of the euro area has continued to rise, and is now
slightly larger than that of China. In contrast, this
appears to be purely due to the very subdued
domestic demand in most euro-area economies,
and a refusal by key euro-area countries, espe-
cially Germany, to recognise any adverse conse-
quences of such surpluses. It is also possibly the
case that despite the improvements in the US and
China’s external positions, there is less evidence
of a major rebalancing of consumption, with
China’s private consumption probably still too low
and that of the US too high, each relative to the rest
of their economies.
All in all, since the G20 took over responsibility for
the global economy in late 2008, it has played an
important role in limiting the likelihood of a bigger
global recession, but in terms of a more balanced
world economy, and one with better and more
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Figure 2. Global total debt, % of GDP, 2001-13
Source: Buttiglione et al (2014).
5. We prefer the term G7+ to
G8, because to us the ‘+’
incorporates both a compo-
nent of novelty and aug-
mented composition.
Canada rather than Australia for example). The UK
position is a little more nuanced given the UK role
in global financial services, but if financial regula-
tory matters were to remain primarily with the
G20, then the UK would have less powerful argu-
ments in its favour. On balance, we are in favour of
recommending that all four BRIC countries should
join Japan, the euro area, the UK and the US as
being at the core of this new revamped G7+ group.
As Figure 3 shows, in terms of global legitimacy,
in population terms the G7+ would be smaller than
the G20, but much bigger than the current G7,
which represents just over 10 percent of the
world’s population. In terms of share of global GDP,
the G7+ performs even better: with just eight key
players, it would cover more than 80 percent of
global output (in current US$ terms, 60 percent in
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equitable global governance, it is unclear that the
G20 has been particularly effective.
OUR PROPOSAL
Based on the findings of our survey of G20 Sher-
pas, we believe that the G20 is unlikely to succeed
in meeting its objectives outside crisis times,
greatly due to the sheer size of its composition
and the breadth of its agenda. There are too many
members and rotating agenda setters in order for
timely albeit important wide-reaching decisions
to be taken. What the world needs, possibly
together with the current G20, is a smaller group
with just as much legitimacy but an ability to act
fast and make more meaningful decisions, espe-
cially when it comes to global economic matters,
notably imbalances and monetary issues. The G5
group in 1985 came together (US, Japan, France,
Germany and the United Kingdom) to play a key
role in averting a shift towards protectionist eco-
nomic policies and presiding over an orderly rebal-
ancing of the US dollar, and then the G7 came into
existence in 1987 (with the addition of Canada
and Italy), and for many years, was an effective
forum for dealing with major pending issues. By
contrast, the G20 is an unwieldy group that, at its
own Sherpas' admission, is only likely to take
decisive action when there is another crisis.
We specifically propose the formation of a new
grouping, which we call G7+ (Table 1)5, in which
China and India would be added, and the three
euro-area countries (Germany, France and Italy)
would give up their seat. The euro area itself would
then become a member. China, the euro area,
India, Japan and the US would be at the core of the
reframed grouping. There might be a rationale to
limit the membership of the new more focused,
yet representative group to these five. But the
other two BRIC heavyweights, Brazil and Russia,
each currently have economies larger than India's
(estimated at market exchange rates, Table 2).
Another option would be that Canada and the UK
should remain, with the group either expanded to
a G9 or kept as a refined G7 excluding Brazil and
India.
Though it is admired by many current G7 partici-
pants, it is difficult to justify Canada’s continued
inclusion on any basis other than history (why
Table 1. Current G7 composition, G7+ proposal
and G5 option (see also footnote 5)
Current G7 G7+ G5
Canada Brazil China
France China Euro area
Germany Euro area India
Italy India Japan
Japan Japan United States
United Kingdom Russia
United States United Kingdom
United States
Table 2: GDP and gross financial assets,
selected countries
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US 22.4 16.4 40.8
Euro area 17.1 12.3 17.3
China 12.7 15.8 8.9
Japan 6.6 4.6 9.9
Germany 4.9 3.4 4.4
France 3.8 2.5 3.7
UK 3.4 2.3 5.0
Brazil 3.0 3.0 1.0
Russia 2.8 3.4 0.4
Italy 2.8 2.0 3.3
India 2.5 6.6 0.9
Canada 2.4 1.5 3.0
Source: IMF WEO, October 2014, Allianz Global Wealth
Report 2014. Note: 2013 data based on IMF estimates;
euro-area financial assets are based on Bruegel estimates.
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6. Authors’ estimations for
2013 based on the “Allianz
Global Wealth Report 2014”.
7. “There are several
difficulties with
membership: too many
Europeans, Argentina not
relevant, Saudi Arabia a
one-issue member; Africa
under-represented.”
In terms of trade in goods and services, the aggre-
gate G7+ would command a world share above 50
percent, increasing in the years to come (thanks
to the rising role of China) (Figure 4). By contrast,
the current G7 has been below the 50 percent
mark since the early 2000s, and is fast plunging.
With such numbers, we can easily imagine impor-
tant trade agreements being struck in such a small
setting, in which leaders can meet to exchange
views openly, helping revamp trade multilateral-
ism in the post-WTO era, and with potential signif-
icant effects on global growth. 
The G7+ would encompass more than 84 percent
of world total financial assets, compared to just
over 70 percent for the current G76. Although less
than the current G20 (94.5 percent), we note this
is still a quite remarkable share after a 60 percent
reduction in the seats (and therefore parties with
a veto). Looking at individual country estimates,
we note how members like Argentina (with total
financial assets estimated at around €40 billion,
or 0.1 percent of the world total) add very little in
terms of coverage of measures agreed on,
although Argentina has a binding say on the
issues at stake, therefore weighing on the
achievement of consensus. This is an issue also
pointed out by one of the G20 Sherpas in our
survey7.
Another issue which was raised indirectly by
respondents to our survey was that some coun-
tries that are currently not present should be. We
note that, for example, Nigeria is now officially a
larger economy than South Africa, and together
with a population nearly four times larger, its claim
to G20 membership would seem quite strong. Of
course, the current G20 members were quite arbi-
trarily picked in 1997-98. Although not a priority
at the current juncture, we could easily imagine
the G20’s composition being expanded to accom-
modate Nigeria and potentially other emerging
countries, once the forum is relieved of the pres-
sure to decide on the crucial global economic chal-
lenges of the moment.
As emphasised, we believe that the G7+ would
exist within the current G20/1. Its agenda would
concentrate on truly globally sensitive economic
and financial matters, as it is usually economic
issues and related imbalances within the coun-
PPP terms) at least until the end of the decade. It
would also bring China directly into a smaller, more
responsible group for key global monetary mat-
ters. As for the euro-area countries, the move to
our proposed format would be a massive signal of
their intent to ensure permanent monetary union,
and maybe even a sign of genuine structural
change.
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Figure 4: Shares of world trade
Source: Bruegel based on O’Neill and Terzi (2014b).
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Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, UN, IMF.
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8. 63 percent of respon-
dents from non-euro area
countries agreed they
would rather liaise with a
joint euro-area representa-
tive in global forums.
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tries we have recommended for G7+ participation
that would have global consequences. Consistent
with the general answers from our Sherpa survey,
we believe that the G7+’s focus should be narrow
but crucial global matters, including shared regu-
latory matters. The interaction between the G7+
and the G20/1 would be similar to the current
structure of the United Nations, with the reframed
G7 providing leadership and fast-paced effective
decision-making at world level, coupled with a
more encompassing and legitimate forum for dis-
cussion. When it came to formal agreements that
required acceptance from a broader group of
important countries, the existing G20/1 would still
play an important role and its support would be
required. Other global matters that are currently
discussed by the G20 could remain with this
group.
FEASIBILITY
With respect to a single euro-area representation,
we were warned by a G20 Sherpa from an interna-
tional organisation that “[it] would make sense
indeed but provided it reflects a genuine unity of
view”. If the euro-area countries are serious about
their own commitment to keep the single currency
in place, we would expect this to be the case
regarding imbalances, monetary and financial reg-
ulation matters, at a time when a banking union is
in the process of being established and an internal
European macroeconomic imbalance monitoring
framework is in place. Our survey also shows how
this move would be welcomed by a majority of
non-euro area G20 partners8.
More practically, we could envisage Euro Summits
to be scheduled in such a way as to discuss ex
ante and give a mandate for discussion to the EU
Council and/or Commission president heading to a
G7+ or G20/1 meeting.
Finally, our survey illustrated a political deadlock
regarding the reform of global international fora,
with emerging economies wanting the advanced
economies to take the lead, and current G7 mem-
bers stating how (yet) another crisis will be needed
for the G20 to be reformed. To avert this admittedly
dismal scenario, we would urge the IMF, as the only
organisation with the necessary credibility, to take
a lead on this G20 reform. As implied by the blunt
comment of a G20 participant, the Fund needs to
raise its delivery standards, and here is a prime
example of how and why.
CONCLUSIONS
The time has come for more concrete steps to
improve the functioning of global economic gov-
ernance while safeguarding its legitimacy. Our
G7+ proposal would considerably improve the
functionality of the current global economic gov-
ernance framework, while maintaining its repre-
sentativeness and therefore legitimacy. It also
offers a way for euro-area members to send a
stronger message to the world about the perma-
nence of monetary union.
Our proposal might be regarded as too conceptual
and impractical in a world in which having a seat at
the highest diplomatic tables is regarded with such
prestige. Moreover, in this regard, who would have
the authority and power to push through such
changes? As world leaders seem to be convinced
that only another major crisis will kick-start a much-
needed thorough review of the current global gov-
ernance framework, the IMF would need to
demonstrate that it is the only organisation that has
the credibility to push for such reforms in non-crisis
times and make up for the lack of leadership on
these topics by many, especially advanced coun-
tries. Waiting for another crisis as a catalyst for
reform is not an option: this time must be different.
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